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Individuals with schizophrenia, particularly those with passivity symptoms, may not feel
in control of their actions, believing them to be controlled by external agents. Cognitive
operations that contribute to these symptoms may include abnormal processing in agency
as well as body representations that deal with body schema and body image. However,
these operations in schizophrenia are not fully understood, and the questions of general
versus specific deficits in individuals with different symptom profiles remain unanswered.
Using the projected-hand illusion (a digital video version of the rubber-hand illusion) with
synchronous and asynchronous stroking (500 ms delay), and a hand laterality judgment
task, we assessed sense of agency, body image, and body schema in 53 people with clini-
cally stable schizophrenia (with a current, past, and no history of passivity symptoms) and
48 healthy controls. The results revealed a stable trait in schizophrenia with no difference
between clinical subgroups (sense of agency) and some quantitative (specific) differences
depending on the passivity symptom profile (body image and body schema). Specifically,
a reduced sense of self-agency was a common feature of all clinical subgroups. However,
subgroup comparisons showed that individuals with passivity symptoms (both current and
past) had significantly greater deficits on tasks assessing body image and body schema,
relative to the other groups. In addition, patients with current passivity symptoms failed
to demonstrate the normal reduction in body illusion typically seen with a 500 ms delay in
visual feedback (asynchronous condition), suggesting internal timing problems. Altogether,
the results underscore self-abnormalities in schizophrenia, provide evidence for both trait
abnormalities and state changes specific to passivity symptoms, and point to a role for
internal timing deficits as a mechanistic explanation for external cues becoming a possible
source of self-body input.
Keywords: schizophrenia, passivity symptoms, first-rank symptoms, rubber-hand illusion, hand laterality, agency,
body schema, body image
INTRODUCTION
In the field of cognitive neuroscience, the “sense of self” refers
to a complex framework, which is derived from cognitive, sen-
sory, and motor systems. In this context, a subjective experience
of “self” is drawn, at least in part, from information gained from
body and motor senses. Self-abnormalities in schizophrenia have
long been documented in the clinical literature. Kurt Schneider
noted that symptoms described “a loss of the very contours of the
self” (1), and Bleuler (2) described the tearing apart or splitting
of psychic functions. Such self-abnormalities appear to be char-
acteristic of schizophrenia (3, 4), and are particularly pronounced
in passivity symptoms (experience of alien control), where indi-
viduals do not feel in control of their movements and believe that
their actions and intentions are controlled by an external agent.
In passivity symptoms, the primary experience is that of a percep-
tual change regarding how the self is experienced alongside the
subjective experience of an external locus of control for internally
generated events.
A contemporary model suggests that such abnormalities arise
from a failure in the mental operations responsible for pre-
dicting the sensory consequences of intended motor commands
(the forward model), where the brain “anticipates” an action
taking place (5–7). Cognitive self-monitoring models, by con-
trast, have explained the observed self-distortions as a failure
of higher order cognitive processes involving source-monitoring,
biases, and post hoc inferences that enable coherent self-referencing
over time (8, 9). It is becoming clear, however, that these pro-
posals are not adequate or sufficient as theoretical frameworks
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for motor passivity symptoms (10, 11). Criticisms include that
motor commands are neither necessary nor sufficient to engen-
der a sense of agency, and that post hoc inferences and biases
cannot fully account for pervasive changes in self-experience and
self-awareness reported by people with schizophrenia. In support,
structured clinical interviews using a clinical–phenomenological
approach demonstrate fundamental changes in embodied self-
presence, self-experience, and self-judgment in individuals with
schizophrenia (12) and in those at high risk of psychosis (13).
In addition, disruptions in the forward model should precipitate
gross motor problems in people with schizophrenia, for which
there is contrary evidence (14, 15).
BODY REPRESENTATION DISTORTIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLAINING SELF-ABNORMALITIES IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
A focus on purely motor or cognitive mechanisms fails to con-
sider other somatic and psychological processes that are necessary
prerequisites for a coherent sense of self. It was recently suggested
that self-deficits in schizophrenia may be better described as broad
deficits in body representations that extend beyond self-agency
(16). This proposal was drawn from evidence showing that the
self emerges from the concurrent activation of multiple body rep-
resentations, which are derived from multimodal sensory input as
well as motor monitoring sources, and that are based on anatom-
ical and neural networks, which play a critical role in one’s sense
of self. Body representations are intrinsically linked to one’s sense
of awareness, identity, self-concept, and sense of uniqueness. They
are needed for the differentiation of body parts and for the accurate
performance of purposeful actions.
A general framework for conceptualizing body representations
includes at least two important representations: body image and
body schema. Body image refers to a top-down cognitive repre-
sentation that integrates the conscious perceptual experiences of
one’s body and contributes to one’s belief and attitude about one’s
body (17–21). Body schema is typically defined as an unconscious
dynamic sensory representation that reflects the position and
movement of the body and limbs in space (17–20). The validity of
these body representations is supported by studies of neurological
patients, where localized lesions can selectively impair one or more
representations (22–26), and from brain imaging studies point-
ing to differential activation of neural networks on tasks selective
for each body representation (27–31). Finally, for the purposes of
the current study, the sense of agency is defined as the experience
that one is the initiator and in control of one’s actions. The sense
of agency is different from body representations as it is critically
dependent on actions and intentions (32–34).
BODY REPRESENTATION DISTORTIONS IN PEOPLE WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA
As detailed previously, people with schizophrenia have difficulty
in correctly attributing agency to self-made movements (35, 36),
indicating distortions in agency. There is also emerging evidence
for disturbances of these multiple body representations in schiz-
ophrenia. For example, empirical findings point to difficulties in
imagining movements (37) pointing to deficits in body schema.
People with schizophrenia also have abnormal body image, as
assessed using a body distortion questionnaire (38). From these
findings, it would appear that the internal modeling of the self is
weakened or more malleable in people with schizophrenia.
The question of general versus specific deficits in individu-
als with different symptom profiles, however, has not yet been
addressed. Specifically, are these body representation-deficits
present in all individuals with schizophrenia or only those with
passivity symptoms? According to the philosophical–theoretical
tradition of self-disturbances in schizophrenia (3), passivity symp-
toms represent the more severe and elaborated form of self-
disturbances in a continuum from non-psychotic experiences
through intermediate phenomena into the manifest psychotic
symptoms. Individuals then transit back and forth between man-
ifest psychosis and the intermediary forms as their clinical con-
dition changes over time. According to this view, there should be
quantitative differences between people with passivity symptoms
compared to individuals with a history of these symptoms and
individuals with no lifetime history of passivity. The performance
of individuals with schizophrenia with different symptom profile
was therefore of interest in the current study.
ASSESSING BODY REPRESENTATIONS IN THE CURRENT STUDY
Body illusions, such as the rubber-hand illusion, are frequently
used to examine processes underlying self-recognition. In the
rubber-hand illusion, participants watch a fake hand being
stroked, while their own hand is synchronously stroked out of
view. This produces an illusory sensation of ownership of the rub-
ber hand and a shift in perceived hand location toward the fake
hand. A key requirement of the illusion is that of synchronous
input between sensory modalities (tactile and vision). In the asyn-
chronous condition, the illusion can be abolished or diminished
by introducing a temporal delay between brush strokes and visual
feedback (39). This condition allows an examination of the effects
of a timing delay on each type of body representation.
People with schizophrenia tend to experience the rubber-hand
illusion more strongly (40, 41) and faster (42) compared to healthy
controls. Additionally, the relocation of the perceived position of
one’s own hand toward the image (“proprioceptive drift”) has
been shown to be greater in schizophrenia than controls, indicat-
ing stronger visual capture of proprioceptive information (40).
The projected-hand illusion, however, has not yet been reported
in the schizophrenia literature. The projected-hand illusion uses
a live video image of the participant’s own hand projected onto
a video screen, allowing a more realistic image of the hand than
the traditional “rubber-hand” methodology, more precise control
over the timing of brush strokes, as well as enhanced merging of
reality into the illusion.
This task assesses two aspects of the sense of self in one
experimental set-up. Using a post-performance questionnaire,
body image can be assessed on domains of “embodiment (of
the ‘other’ projected hand)” and “disembodiment (of one’s own
hand),” and the sense of agency with the subjective sensation
of motor control (over both the “other” and own hand). Psy-
chometric studies show that illusory sensations over the “other”
hand are simultaneously associated with a reduction of the same
sensations in the real hand (43). For example, embodiment of
the “other” hand is proportionally related to disembodiment of
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one’s real hand, with the total embodiment of both being equal
to one single hand (44, 45). A similar balance also exists with
the sense of agency (46). Disembodiment (of limbs) and reduced
agency (over actions) are clinical features of persons with passiv-
ity symptoms, so performance on such measures are of particular
interest.
In order to assess the third type of body representation (body
schema), the current study employed the hand laterality task (47).
In this task, participants are asked to make a judgment regard-
ing whether an image of a hand is that of a right or left hand
by mentally rotating their own hand to match the hand on the
screen. Both response times and accuracy are recorded. Evidence
that imagined movements are dependent upon the body schema
and include findings that performance on this task is influenced by
the same biophysical constraints that underlie performed actions
(48). A recent study shows that schizophrenia individuals (n= 13)
were impaired on the task (49), although an analysis of passivity
symptoms was not conducted.
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
In the current study, we studied body representations in 53 indi-
viduals with schizophrenia and 48 healthy controls on the val-
idated projected-hand illusion (50, 51) and the hand laterality
task (47). Individuals with schizophrenia were clustered into sub-
groups based upon their lifetime history of passivity symptoms.
The research questions were as follows: (1) what is the pattern
of performance on measures of body schema, body image, and
the sense of agency in individuals with schizophrenia compared
to controls?; (2) does the evidence point to a stable trait for
schizophrenia (no difference between clinical subgroups) or to
quantitative differences depending on the passivity symptom pro-
file? Our hypotheses are that body representation distortions will
be present in varying degrees in the clinical population: individu-
als who are currently symptomatic (with passivity symptoms) will
have the most severe abnormalities on all body representations,
and those with a past history of symptoms, by virtue of their trait
vulnerability, will have greater abnormalities than those with no
history of symptoms and healthy controls but less than those who
are currently symptomatic.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The patient sample included individuals with schizophrenia or
schizoaffective disorder (53 total, 36 males) recruited from the
research database of the WA Family Study of Schizophrenia (52,
53). All patients met both ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria for a
lifetime diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder,
and were community outpatients not currently admitted into a
psychiatric hospital and were treated with psychotropic medica-
tion. Exclusion criteria included comorbid organic brain disease
or substance-use disorder that could account for the psychotic
symptoms or language difficulties.
Healthy controls (48 total, 24 males) were recruited through
community advertising. Potential controls were excluded if they
had a history of a psychotic disorder, or if any of their first-degree
relatives had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, schizophrenia-
spectrum, or bipolar affective disorder.
The study protocol was explained to all participants and writ-
ten informed consent was obtained. The study was approved by
the North Metropolitan Mental Health Service Human Research
Ethics Committee and conformed to the appropriate regulatory
standards.
CLINICAL EVALUATION
Clinical evaluation was conducted with the Scales for the Assess-
ment of Positive and Negative Symptoms [SAPS and SANS; (54,
55)]. Passivity symptoms were assessed using the Passivity Symp-
toms Interview (PSI) (56) with selected items from the Schedule
for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry [SCAN, Version 2.1;
items: 17.008, 18.005–18.010, 18.012–18.017, see Ref. (57)]. All
symptoms were rated in accordance with stringent definitions and
criteria assessed for lifetime history and presence in the last 4 weeks
as determined by self-reports and case-note reviews. Patients were
rated as having current passivity symptoms (current group) if they
reported two or more such symptoms in the past 4 weeks (n= 20).
Patients were rated as “Past” (n= 12) if they had a positive rating
of at least two passivity symptoms in the past but not within the
past 4 weeks or “Never” (n= 21) if they had never experienced
these symptoms during any period. Independent classification
of patients into groups was conducted by two of the investiga-
tors (Kyran T. Graham and Flavie Waters) and rated based on
consensus.
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS
Hand illusion
Each participant sat in front of a table with a Fujitsu 17′′ color
monitor embedded horizontally in the top, with both hands rest-
ing on top of the table. The right hand was hidden behind a
removable curtain. An image of this hand was captured by an ana-
log camera (AVC-561, AVTECH, Taiwan) and transmitted to the
monitor via an analog delay line (DL1B-5379, Ovation Systems
Ltd., UK). The real hand and the image of the hand were sepa-
rated by 15 cm. A photograph of the set-up used can be seen in
Figure 1. There were two delay conditions in the illusion; synchro-
nous (<10 ms video feedback) and asynchronous (an additional
imposed 500 ms delay). Participant were exposed to each con-
dition once (3 min each), with the order of presentation being
counter-balanced across participants. A 20-item questionnaire
assessing the subjective experience of the illusion was administered
after each condition (46); adapted from Ref. (43). Items relating to
the component Deafference were not included as the component
does not pertain to body representations. Each item was rated on
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from −3 (strongly disagree) to +3
(strongly agree). A recent PCA (46) identified that the following
components could be extracted from the questionnaire, assessing
body image (“Disembodiment of own hand” and “Embodiment
of the ‘Other’ hand”), and the sense of agency (“Agency over the
‘Other’ hand,” and “Loss of agency over own hand”) in both syn-
chronous and asynchronous conditions. Table 1 shows the 20 items
(Embodiment items 1–8, Disembodiment 13–17, Agency 9–10,
and Loss of agency 11–12).
Hand laterality task
For each trial, a picture of a hand, palm down, was displayed on
a computer screen (47). Participants were instructed to indicate
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if the hand was a left or right hand by pressing an appropriate
key on a keyboard. Each picture was either a left or right hand
and rotated by either 0°, 90° medially, 90° laterally, or 180°. There
FIGURE 1 | Photograph of the projected-hand illusion is shown.
were six repeats of each hand/rotation combination for a total of
48 trials per participant. The stimuli were presented in a random
order. Participants were instructed not to make major movements
of their hands or heads while making the judgments. Four practice
trials with feedback were given to each participant before com-
mencing the main experiment. The experiment was produced
using E-Prime 1.2 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pitts-
burgh, PA, USA). In order to rule out possible abnormalities in
mental rotation, a similar task was conducted in which the letter
F was displayed instead of a hand. The letter was either oriented
normally or mirrored along the vertical axis. The same number
of trials of letter and rotation combinations was used as the hand
laterality task. For both tasks, accuracy and response time were
recorded.
COGNITIVE TASKS
The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) (58) was included
as a measure of pre-morbid intelligence. Trail Making Test Form
A (TMTA) (59) provided a measure of speed of processing. The
Digit Span (DS) provided a measure of attention span (forward
span) and working memory (backward span) (59).
STATISTICAL METHODS
All statistical analyses and figures were completed using the sta-
tistical software R [version 3.0.1; Ref. (60)], and the packages
“nlme” (61) and “car” (62). Analyses were performed using lin-
ear mixed-effects models with the mean score on the relevant
subscale as the dependent variable, delay condition (synchronous
or asynchronous) was the within-subjects variable, group (Con-
trols, Current, Past, or Never) as the between-subjects variable
and participant as the random effects term. Similarly, for the
hand laterality task, separate models were created for (a) mean
accuracy (% incorrect) and (b) mean response time (seconds).
For these, group was the between-subjects independent vari-
able and rotation (0°, 90° medial, 90° lateral, and 180°) was the
within-subjects variable. Performance (% incorrect and response
Table 1 | Questionnaire items used during the projected-hand illusion.
It seemed like . . . Component
. . . I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than at an image Embodiment
. . . the image began to resemble my real hand Embodiment
. . . the image of the hand belonged to me Embodiment
. . . the image was my hand Embodiment
. . . the image was part of my body Embodiment
. . . my hand was in the location where the image was Embodiment
. . . the image was in the location where my hand was Embodiment
. . . the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the image Embodiment
. . . I could have moved the image of the hand Agency over the image
. . . like I was in control of the image Agency over the image
. . . I was unable to move my hand Loss of agency over own hand
. . . I couldn’t have moved my hand if I had wanted Loss of agency over own hand
. . . I couldn’t really tell where my hand was Disembodiment
. . . my hand had disappeared Disembodiment
. . . my hand was out of my control Disembodiment
. . . my hand was moving toward the image Disembodiment
. . . the image was moving toward my hand Disembodiment
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time) on each rotation for the letter rotation task was included
as a covariate in these analyses. Where analysis of deviance
(ANODEV) on the terms of the model revealed significant dif-
ferences, interaction contrasts comparing difference in scores
on each of the levels of the factor were performed, i.e., [Con-
trols(Synch)−Controls(Asynch)]− [Current(Synch)−Current
(Asynch)]. Alpha was set to 0.05.
RESULTS
PROJECTED-HAND ILLUSION
Demographic information for participants can be seen in Table 2.
Where there were differences between groups, these data were then
entered into the projected-hand illusion analyses as covariates.
However, there were no significant effects of any of the covariates
for the PHI data (p > 0.1) and so these were removed from the
final model.
Schizophrenia groups combined
Performance was first examined with a comparison of people with
schizophrenia as a group versus healthy controls to determine
overall effects of diagnosis while maximizing power to detect an
effect. SAPS and SANS scores and chlorpromazine equivalents
were included as further covariates in all projected-hand illusion
analyses but were removed from the final model, as none were
significant. People with schizophrenia reported increased feelings
of disembodiment [F(1, 99)= 29.5, p < 0.0001], and a greater
loss of agency over their own hand [F(1, 99)= 21.3, p < 0.0001]
compared to controls, showing greater deficits identifying the
experience of their own body.
There were no main effects of group [F(1, 99)= 1.83, p= 0.18]
or interaction [F(1, 1498)= 2.65, p= 0.10] on the embodiment of
the “other” hand component [F(1, 97)= 3.63, p= 0.06]. Further,
there was no significant difference between groups in the sense of
agency over the “other” hand [F(1, 99)= 0.19, p= 0.66].
Group comparisons – body image (embodiment of image)
Analysis of deviance revealed no main effects of group on Embod-
iment [F(3, 97)= 0.83, p= 0.48], but there was a significant main
effect of delay [F(1, 1496)= 57.8, p < 0.0001], with ratings being
higher in the synchronous condition. There was a significant inter-
action between group (Controls, Current, Past, and Never) and
delay condition [F(3, 1496)= 4.94, p= 0.002]. Interaction con-
trasts revealed significant differences between Current and each
of the other groups: Controls (p= 0.001), Never (p= 0.04), and
Past (p= 0.0006). Controls and patients in the Past and Never
groups demonstrated embodiment of the hand in the synchro-
nous condition, which was reduced in the asynchronous condition.
By contrast, patients in the Current group showed no differ-
ence in performance between the synchronous and the asynchro-
nous conditions, exhibiting embodiment in both conditions (see
Figure 2A).
Group comparisons – body image (disembodiment of own hand)
For disembodiment (Figure 2B), there was a main effect of
group [F(3, 97)= 13.1, p < 0.0001], but not delay condition
[F(1, 892)= 1.25, p= 0.26] and the interaction was not sig-
nificant [F(3, 892)= 6.78, p= 0.08]. Disembodiment of own
hand was significantly higher in the Past (p < 0.0001), Cur-
rent (p < 0.0001), and the Never groups (p= 0.01), relative to
controls. The Current and Past groups were marginally signif-
icantly different from each other (p= 0.05) but both reported
higher disembodiment than the Never group (Past p= 0.009,
Current p= 0.04).
Group comparisons – agency (agency over the image)
Analysis of deviance revealed no main effect of group [F(3,
97)= 0.16, p= 0.92], but there was a significant main effect of
delay condition [F(1, 292)= 19.2, p < 0.0001], with an overall
increase in reported agency over the “other” hand in the syn-
chronous compared to asynchronous condition. The interaction
between group and delay condition neared, but did not reach,
significance [F(3, 292)= 7.59, p= 0.055]. However, given the
p-value, it was decided that it was reasonable to perform inter-
action contrasts. Figure 2C shows that Controls, Never, and
Past all demonstrated increased agency over the “other” hand,
Table 2 | Demographic information of participants.
Controls (n=48) Never (n=21) Past (n=12) Current (n=20)
Sex (M/F)a 24/24 14/7 10/2 12/8
Age (years)b 46.2±1.68 42.5±1.57 43.6±2.84 44.0±2.06
Years of educationb 13.7±0.35 12.9±0.37 13.0±0.54 13.7±0.57
WTARb 104±1.9 100±3.3 95±3.4 96±3.2*
Trail Making Test Ab 31.9±2.82 53.0±7.47*** 51.2±11.5*** 45.7±8.68**
SAPS compositeb – 12.0±2.3∧∧∧ 19.2±3.5 29.2±3.2
SANS compositeb – 21.8±3.6 29.8±4.7 24.7±2.5
Chlorpromazine equivalents (mg)b – 677±121 805±140 754±106
Mean±SEM of selected covariates.
aFisher’s Exact Test.
bOne-way ANOVA with Tukey’s HSD post hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected).
Different from controls: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Different from Pass. Current: ∧p<0.05, ∧∧p< 0.01, ∧∧∧p<0.001.
Antipsychotic doses converted into chlorpromazine equivalents using the formulae given in (69–71).
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FIGURE 2 | Questionnaire responses assessing (A) Embodiment,
(B) Disembodiment, (C) Agency over the “Other” hand, and
(D) Loss of agency over own hand, during the projected-hand
illusion after asynchronous (Asynch) and synchronous (Synch)
stimulation in controls, people with schizophrenia with no
history of passivity symptoms (Never), people with a past
history of passivity symptoms (Past), and people with current
experiences of passivity symptoms (Current). Questions were
answered on a 7-point Likert scale. Data are mean±SEM. *p < 0.05,
**p <0.001, ***p <0.0001.
after synchronous compared to asynchronous stimulation (treat-
ment contrasts; p= 0.007, p= 0.002, p= 0.02, respectively), while
the Current group failed to demonstrate the expected decrease
in the asynchronous condition (p= 0.98) and reported similar
levels of agency after both synchronous and asynchronous stim-
ulation. However, the only pairwise interaction treatment con-
trast that was significant was between Current and Never groups
(p= 0.009).
Group comparisons – agency (loss of agency of own hand)
For the loss of agency of own hand component, there was a sig-
nificant main effect of group [F(3, 97)= 25.0, p < 0.0001] and a
significant effect of delay condition [F(1, 293)= 3.97, p= 0.046]
such that loss of agency ratings were higher in the synchro-
nous condition but no significant interaction [F(3, 293)= 0.49,
p= 0.69]. Controls reported significantly less loss of agency
over their own hand relative to the Current (p= 0.004), Past
(p < 0.0001), and Never groups (p= 0.003), but there were no
significant differences between schizophrenia groups (all p > 0.1;
see Figure 2D).
HAND LATERALITY TASK
Scales for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms score, Scales for
the Assessment of Negative Symptoms score, and chlorpromazine
equivalents were initially included as covariates in all hand later-
ality analyses, but none had a significant association so they were
excluded from the final model.
Schizophrenia groups combined (hand laterality task – response
time)
As expected, on response time with the schizophrenia groups and
healthy controls, the ANODEV displayed a significant main effect
of rotation [F(3, 700)= 460, p < 0.0001] with the response time
on 0° trials significantly different from 90° Medial (p < 0.0001),
90° Lateral (p < 0.0001), and 180° trials (p < 0.0001). There was
a main effect whereby individuals with schizophrenia had longer
response times across all rotations [F(1, 99)= 17.7, p < 0.0001],
as well as an interaction of group and rotation [F(3, 693)= 12.8,
p= 0.005], indicating a further increase in response time on the
90° lateral (p < 0.0001) and 180° rotations (p < 0.0001) compared
to controls.
Schizophrenia groups combined (hand laterality task – accuracy)
There were significant positive associations between accuracy
on the hand laterality task and WTAR scores [F(1, 78)= 15.9,
p < 0.0001, slope= 0.26], and accuracy on the letter rotation task
[F(1, 560)= 4.91, p < 0.03, slope= 0.06], so these variables were
retained as covariates. There was a significant effect of rotation
[F(3, 560)= 46.2, p < 0.0001]. Contrasts demonstrated that accu-
racy on 0° trials is not different to 90° Medial (p= 0.53) or 90°
Lateral (p= 0.08) trials, but significantly different from 180° trials
(p < 0.0001). There was no significant main effect of group (schiz-
ophrenia group versus Controls) in accuracy [F(1, 78)= 0.14,
p= 0.71]. There was a significant interaction between group and
rotation [F(3, 560)= 9.13, p= 0.03] due to the schizophrenia
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group being significantly less accurate on the 90° Lateral rotation
(p= 0.03).
Group comparisons (hand laterality task – response times)
Response time on the letter rotation task covaried significantly
with the response time on the hand rotation task [F(1, 687)= 13.9,
p= 0.0002, slope= 0.10]. However, all significant effects remained
so with inclusion of the covariate. No other covariates, including
chlorpromazine equivalents, were significant. There was a signif-
icant main effect of group on response times [F(3, 97)= 20.6,
p < 0.0001]. There was also a significant interaction between
group and rotation type [F(9, 687)= 20.9, p= 0.01]; response
times of Current and Past were significantly longer than con-
trols at 90° lateral (p= 0.03 and p= 0.03) and 180° rotations
(p= 0.009 and p= 0.005), and Never had significantly greater
response times compared to Controls at all rotations (0°, p= 0.01;
90° medial, p= 0.002; 90° lateral, p < 0.0001; 180°, p < 0.0001)
(Figure 3).
Group comparisons (hand laterality task – accuracy)
There was a significant interaction between group and rotation
[F(9, 554)= 27.9, p= 0.001], as well as a significant main effect
of rotation [F(3, 554)= 47.4, p < 0.0001]. To investigate the cause
of the interaction between group and rotation type, interaction
treatment contrasts were performed. There were no significant
group differences at 90° medial rotation (all p > 0.3). At 90° lateral
rotations, the Current and Past (but not Never) were significantly
less accurate than controls (p= 0.006 and 0.007, respectively). At
180° rotations, only Past were significantly less accurate than con-
trols at 180° rotations (p= 0.0007). There was no main effect of
group [F(3, 76)= 0.94, p= 0.20] on accuracy. In regards to the
covariates, higher accuracy on the letter rotation task was asso-
ciated with higher accuracy of hand laterality judgments [F(1,
554)= 4.61, p= 0.01, slope= 0.06], and a higher WTAR score
was associated with higher accuracy [F(1, 76)= 14.9, p= 0.002,
slope= 0.26]. All significant effects remained after inclusion of
the covariates.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of the current study was to assess the integrity of
body representations in individuals with schizophrenia compared
to controls and the pattern of performance with regards to the
presence of passivity symptoms on a body illusion and a hand
laterality task.
WHAT IS THE PATTERN OF PERFORMANCE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA COMPARED TO CONTROLS?
Individuals with schizophrenia showed abnormal performance
on both the hand illusion and hand laterality tasks. During the
hand illusion, individuals with schizophrenia, as a group, showed
increased disembodiment of their own hand, as well as a decreased
sense of agency over their own hand, relative to controls.
The hand illusion, with its subjective reports, provides a partic-
ularly convenient method to examine components of body repre-
sentations and self- and non-self-dimensions in one experimental
set-up. The current study showed dissociation in performance by
people with schizophrenia between self-embodiment/agency and
other-embodiment/agency. Specifically, there was no significant
difference between the schizophrenia and controls groups on
embodiment and sense of agency over the “other” hand, although
the clinical group was particularly impaired on trials requiring the
processing of their own (self) body. This perhaps suggests that
the representation of other/external people is relatively preserved
in schizophrenia, but that the representation of their own body
is impaired. In other words, these individuals may be particularly
susceptible to disruptions in self-processes, producing a sense of
disconnectedness from their own body, but that the embodiment
and sense of agency over external objects/bodies are unaffected.
FIGURE 3 | Mean response times (seconds, columns) and inaccuracy (%,
lines) of hand laterality judgments at 0°, 90° Medial, 90° Lateral, and 180°
rotations for Controls, people with no history of passivity symptoms
(Never), people with a past history of passivity symptoms (Past), and
people with current experiences of passivity symptoms (Current). Data
are mean±SEM. See text for treatment contrasts.
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In a speculative tone, the imbalance between self- and non-self-
representations may give rise to distortions regarding the inference
of other people’s intention, perhaps triggering or increasing the
vulnerability to delusions.
Disordered self-agency is a common finding in experimental
tasks testing the forward model and cognitive self-monitoring
models (36, 63–66). However, few studies have demonstrated dis-
embodiment in schizophrenia. While patients frequently complain
of diminished representations of the bodily self (1, 4), depersonal-
ization and feeling of disembodiment (67, 68), and self-referential
processing difficulties (66, 67), such subjective reports are rarely
assessed in experimental conditions. Altogether, the current find-
ings, using a hand illusion, provide support for anomalies in
self-agency and self-ownership in this group.
Performance on the hand laterality task provided evidence
of additional changes in body schema. On this task, individu-
als with schizophrenia took significantly longer to respond than
controls. In addition, this clinical group had significantly lower
accuracy on 90° lateral and 180° rotation trials. These are the
most difficult trials, even in healthy groups, and performance is
typically less accurate and slower than on the other trials (47).
In individuals with schizophrenia, this pattern of performance
on error and latency measures could not be explained simply
in terms of impaired visuospatial abilities or generally slower
responses, since controlling for performance on the letter rota-
tion task with the same rotation conditions did not change the
results. Given that the hand laterality task is under the same
biophysical constraints as performed actions, the current results
point to specific difficulties in the processes involving the syn-
chronization of proprioceptive and tactile inputs into a repre-
sentation of the body in space in schizophrenia. These findings
on the hand laterality task underscore those of de Vignemont
et al. (n= 13) (49). In contrast to the current study, however,
they showed an increase in errors on all rotations in their schiz-
ophrenia group relative to controls. Their task was similar to
ours, so it is likely that differences in patient characteristics
or in statistical power contributed to this small difference in
performance.
Together, the current findings point to deficits in sense of
agency, body image, and body schema in schizophrenia. Perfor-
mance on these tasks was not related to chlorpromazine equiva-
lents, so antipsychotics dosages are an unlikely contributor to per-
formance. Similarly, performance on the task was not correlated
with other clinical or cognitive performance score. We believe that
it is the first report of deficits in multiple body representations in
schizophrenia.
DOES THE EVIDENCE POINT TO A STABLE TRAIT FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA
(NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLINICAL SUBGROUPS) OR TO
QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCES DEPENDING ON THE PASSIVITY
SYMPTOM PROFILE?
If abnormal body representations represent a stable trait for schiz-
ophrenia in toto, then no significant differences among Current
(current presence of passivity), Past (past history of passivity),
and Never (no history of passivity) would be expected, although
they would still perform differently from controls. Only partial evi-
dence was found for this suggestion. Specifically, evidence for such
a “stable trait” was only observed in the domain of agency, where
a reduced sense of agency over one’s own hand was a common
feature of all three patient groups.
By contrast, performance on the other variables supported our
initial hypothesis that there should be quantitative differences
between people with passivity symptoms (“Current”) compared to
individuals with a history of these symptoms (“Past”), and individ-
uals with no lifetime history of passivity (“Never”). Performance
on tasks assessing body image suggested quantitative differences
depending on the passivity symptom profile of the clinical group.
Individuals with passivity symptoms (both current and past) had
significantly greater changes in body image as indicated by their
higher rating of items relating to disembodiment compared to the
group with no history of these symptoms, who in turn reported
more disembodiment compared to healthy controls.
In accordance with the above, on the hand laterality task, the
Current and Past groups demonstrated reduced accuracy on judg-
ments of the 90° lateral and 180°(Past only) rotations. This finding
is in line with demonstrations of impaired performance on a
task of motor imagery in people with motor passivity symp-
toms (37). While this points to problems in body schema, it is
important to note that actions and proprioception remain largely
unimpaired in this group (14, 15). This suggests that only some
subcomponents of body schema are impaired, either in the access
pathways to this information or in the integration with other body
representations (37).
In sum, the evidence points to both general (trait) deficits in
all individuals with schizophrenia (the sense of agency) and quan-
titative (specific) differences depending on the passivity symp-
tom profile (body image and body schema). Questions remain,
however, regarding the processes that separate individuals with
current passivity symptoms from those with a history of these
symptoms. Both groups show deficits in sense of agency, body
image, and body schema, so these processes are not sufficient
alone for passivity symptoms. What determines whether patients
experience these symptoms? A clue lies in the examination of per-
formance on the hand illusion, specifically on the asynchronous
condition.
DECREASED SENSITIVITY TO TIMING DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH
PASSIVITY SYMPTOMS
On all measures of the hand illusion involving timing delays, indi-
viduals in the Current passivity group distinguished themselves
from the other groups. Most remarkably, they failed to demon-
strate the normal reduction in the body illusion typically seen
with a 500 ms delay in visual feedback (asynchronous condition).
This performance was specific to those in the Current group, as
the other clinical groups (including the Past group) showed the
expected illusory decrease on the asynchronous condition. In other
words, individuals with passivity symptoms continued to experi-
ence illusions of embodiment and sense of agency over the “other”
hand, when the other groups did not. This suggests that the tem-
poral window that provides links between self and external stimuli
is significantly, and abnormally, elongated in people with passivity
symptoms. Alternatively, it is possible that the Current group uses
temporal cues during multisensory integration to a lesser extent
than the other groups.
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The functional significance of this finding cannot be under-
stated, given that internal timing precision is critical for a
range of processes including sensory–motor awareness and self-
recognition (66, 72, 73). Precise timing is needed for the syn-
chronization of motor, cognitive, and sensory signals. It is also
needed to shape sensory awareness and in the formation of
causal mental associations. Specifically, voluntary actions, which
are followed by a sensory event, are perceived as shifted closer
together in time than they actually are, a psychological phe-
nomenon termed intentional binding (74), which contributes
toward the sense of self-agency. Abnormal internal timing mech-
anisms in people with passivity symptom therefore have much
explanatory power for their disordered self-attribution system.
Other evidence is provided by studies showing time perception
impairments in individuals with schizophrenia (75, 76). Passivity
symptoms studies also show dysfunctions in cognitive and motor
timing. Specifically, these individuals perceive external events to
be closer in time together than they are (66, 77, 78), which
may impact on the integrity of self- and non-self-attribution
processes.
The current hand illusion findings are particularly pertinent,
because they show that individual with passivity symptoms experi-
ences an illusory sensation of ownership and agency over an image
that is spatially and temporally disjointed from the sensorimotor
processes linked to their real hand. It is therefore not surprising
that these individuals do not feel in control of their movements,
and that they experience confusion regarding the origins of their
actions and intentions. Such fragmented phenomena would lead
to substantial confusion for internally generated events. If a larger
window of integration was indeed closely associated with passivity
symptoms, it would be expected to have impact on other behaviors
and also other non-body-related illusions such as the ventriloquist
illusion.
A possible mechanism might occur via dopaminergic path-
ways. Using an amphetamine challenge in healthy volunteers as a
model of psychoses-related responses in the rubber-hand illusion,
our group (44) found that amphetamine appeared to increase the
temporal envelope of associability of the rubber-hand visual cues
to the feel of the stroking (i.e., had a selective effect of increasing
the illusion in the asynchronous condition) in a profile of perfor-
mance, which was similar to the pattern of performance in the
Current group. Together with their functional role of assigning
salience to external stimuli (35), dopaminergic pathways may well
contribute to confusion, and misattribution, of agency via changes
in the normal temporal window for associability such that external
cues become a possible source of body input.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
It should be noted here that the hand illusion offers signifi-
cant advantage over other paradigms assessing sense of agency
in schizophrenia (35, 36). Notably, subjective reports of online and
prospective actions (e.g.,“I am able to move it”) in the hand illusion
are superior to tasks assessing actions retrospectively (“I moved it”),
therefore overcoming criticisms about the involvement of other
cognitive processes (35), which render such retrospective predic-
tions unreliable (36) [also see Ref. (14, 79)]. Such differentiation
between prospective and retrospective assessments is thought to be
significant when assessing agency reliably (35). That the items of
the questionnaire of the current study assessed prospective agency
possibly explains why there was no significant difference between
the schizophrenia groups on the loss of agency over own hand
questions; it would appear that the changes in agency are limited
to retrospective agency in passivity symptoms. Confirmation of
this finding could not be carried out as the current study did not
assess retrospective agency.
A further limitation of the current study is that Current group
had a significantly higher level of positive symptoms as assessed
on the SAPS. It may therefore be that overall illness severity con-
tributed to the current results, rather than the presence of passivity
symptoms. However, several lines of evidence argue against this
proposal: (i) there were no significant associations of SAPS scores
with any of the dependent variables; (ii) SANS scores did not dif-
fer between groups; (iii) chlorpromazine equivalents did not differ
between groups; and (iv) the groups did not differ from each other
on cognitive performance.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the current study demonstrated both stable traits
in schizophrenia (sense of agency) and some quantitative differ-
ences depending on passivity symptom profile (body image and
body schema). In addition, the presence of passivity symptoms was
linked to an enduring experience of body illusion that was resistant
to both spatial separation and temporal delay. Our proposal is that
passivity symptoms are linked to deficits in body representations
encompassing body image and body schema, changes in the sense
of agency, alongside internal timing problems that contribute to
excessive associability with external sensory stimuli, producing the
sensation that one’s actions are controlled by an external agent.
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